October 8 and 11, 2002: Iraq, UN Dispute Conditions of Inspectors’ Return

Chief UN inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, send a letter to the Iraqi government, which lists conclusions they had drawn from the October 1 meeting with Iraqi arms officials (see October 1, 2002). The letter asks that Iraqi officials respond with a letter confirming these conclusions. But the inspectors’ letter actually includes additional conditions not discussed during the October 1 meeting, such as the right of inspectors to conduct interviews and choose “the mode and location” for them as well as the right for UN member states to fly U-2 spy planes over Iraq. [Reuters, 10/12/2002]
Iraqi Response 'Another Example of Evasion' - Iraqi officials respond to the request on October 11 with a letter signed by Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, an adviser to Saddam Hussein. The letter agrees only to the conditions that were agreed upon during the October 1 meeting. [New York Times, 10/12/2002; Reuters, 10/12/2002; New York Times, 10/12/2002] The Bush administration seizes on the Iraqi response, calling it another example of evasion. “We are not surprised that once again the Iraqis want to delay and deceive.… We’ve had 16 resolutions and 11 years of playing this game, and it’s time the Security Council takes action,” says Richard Grenell, spokesman for US Ambassador John Negroponte. [New York Times, 10/12/2002]
Threat from White House - When Blix and ElBaradei discuss the issue with Vice President Cheney, he will threaten to ‘discredit’ them if they do not support the US position (see October 11, 2002).