9
Events (367)
- January 1997: Mystery Informant Confirms Al-Qaeda’s Inner Workings
- February 2001: Al-Qaeda Source Indicates Bin Laden Disappointed with Lack of US Response toColeBombing
- February 2003 or After: 9/11 Commission Staff Set up ‘Back-Channel Network’ to Report on Executive Director Zelikow’s Behavior
- (February-April 2003): 9/11 Commissioners Rarely Visit Commission’s Offices, Giving Executive Director Zelikow More Power
- February-April 2004: Bush Administration Withholds Clinton Documents from 9/11 Commission
- February 2004: 9/11 Commission Receives Documentation Relating to Able Danger Program
- February 2004: Bush Administration Fails to Act on 9/11 Inquiry Recommendations
- February-July 2004: 9/11 Commission Does Not Find Material about Intercepts of Hijackers’ Calls in NSA Files
- February 2004: 9/11 Commission Does Not Subpoena White House over Presidential Daily Briefs due to Last-Ditch Intervention by Executive Director Zelikow
- February 1999: CIA Apparently Confused over Authority to Assassinate Bin Laden
- March 2001 and After: Hijackers Continue to Associate with Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam
- March 2003: Zelikow and 9/11 Commission Consultant Complete Outline of Final Report before Staff Start Writing It
- March 2003-July 2004: White House Has Better Relationship with 9/11 Commission’s Democratic Vice Chairman than Republican Chairman
- March 2004: CIA Finds 9/11 Hijackers Used 364 Aliases and Name Variants
- 2003: 9/11 Commissioner Becomes Involved in Fraud Scandal, Has Little Time for Commission
- Late April-Mid-May 2000: Atta Leaves Numerous Clues While Seeking Crop-Dusting Airplane Loan
- April 2001: FBI Translators Learn Al-Qaeda Suicide Pilots Plan to Hit Skyscrapers in US and Europe
- (April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from 9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from Congressional Inquiry
- April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
- April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
- April 1998: Alleged Hijacker Associate Receives Money from Saudi Embassy
- (Mid 2004): 9/11 Commission Staff Doubts Cheney’s Account of Shootdown Order on 9/11
- May 2003 and Before: 9/11 Commissioner Argues Panel Should Investigate False Claims of Iraq Link to 9/11, but Other Commissioners Not Interested
- May-August 2003: 9/11 Commission Has Difficulty Gaining Access to Recording of Air Threat Conference
- May-June 2004: Zelikow Has Portions of 9/11 Commission Report Rewritten to Be More Favorable to National Security Adviser Rice
- May 2005: Author Claims CIA Hid Explosive Zubaida Interrogation Transcripts from 9/11 Commission and FBI
- May 2000: Future Authors of 9/11 Report Produce John F. Kennedy Book Riddled with Errors
- June 2003: 9/11 Commission Begins Moves to Get Rid of Troublesome Member
- June 2004: Zelikow Has Comparison with Clinton Unfavorable to Bush Deleted from 9/11 Commission Report
- June-November 2004: Critical CIA Report on 9/11 Failures Is Finished, but Its Release Is Successfully Delayed until after Presidential Election
- June 2004: Top Democrat Helps Get Passages Critical of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice Deleted from Final Text of 9/11 Commission Report
- June 2004: Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Team Leader Delete Passages about Apparent Saudi Support for Hijackers from Main Text of Final Report
- June 2004: Two More 9/11 Commission Staffers Review Largely Ignored NSA Material, Think It Is Important
- Early June 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Accepts Lack of Connections between Iraq and Al-Qaeda
- June 2004: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Discusses Key Presidential Daily Brief with CIA Analyst, Allegedly Pressures Analyst to Accept White House Version of Events
- June 2005: State Department Adviser Challenges Legal Justifications for Torture
- June 1999-March 2000: FBI Investigates Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam and Misses His Contacts with 9/11 Hijackers
- July 2001: Seven 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Obtain IDs in New Jersey
- July 2004: 9/11 Commission Staffers Protest over ‘Whitewash’ of FBI’s Performance before Attacks, Win Minor Changes to Final Report
- Mid-August 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Hanjour Rents Plane in Maryland; He Is Still Not Skilled Enough to Fly Solo
- August 2001: FAA Told to Warn Airlines of Hijacking or Airliner Bombing in New York, Atlanta, and Other Locations
- August 2003 and After: 9/11 Commission Sends Single Analyst to Review CIA Material
- August 2003: 9/11 Commission Staffer Reviews NSC Documents; Favors Clarke’s Account of Bush Administration’s Treatment of Terrorist Warnings over Rice’s
- August 2003: FAA Falsely Claims It Has Produced All 9/11-Related Documents for 9/11 Commission
- August 2003: FBI and CIA Forced to Reopen Investigation into Saudi Link to 9/11
- August 22-November 2002: Possible Hijacker Associate Is Arrested, Then Deported
- August 1994-July 2001: Possible Terrorist Front Man with Saudi Backing Settles in San Diego
- Late August 1998: CIA Learns KSM Involved in Embassy Bombings
- Late-September 2001-August 2004: Reports of Hijackers’ US Spending and Bank Accounts Change over Time
- September 2003: 9/11 Commission Discovers FAA Has Withheld Documents from Investigators