Bureau Of Intelligence And Research
Events (36)
- October 15, 2001: Italian Intelligence Provides CIA with Report Alleging that Niger Agreed to Sell Iraq Uranium 2001-10-15
- November 14, 2001: State Department Intelligence Bureau: No Evidence Iraq Has Nuclear Weapons Program 2001-11-14
- January 31, 2002: State Department’s Intelligence Analysts Warn Powell about 38 Claims in Draft UN Speech 2002-01-31
- February 5, 2002: CIA Issues Second Report on Alleged Iraqi Efforts to Obtain Uranium 2002-02-05
- February 19, 2002: Intelligence Analysts Discuss Merits of Sending Wilson to Niger 2002-02-19
- March 1, 2002: State Department Intelligence Memo Argues It Is ‘Unlikely’ That Iraq Attempted to Purchase Uranium from Niger 2002-03-01
- March 4, 2002: INR Memo Casts Doubts on Alleged Uranium Deal between Iraq and Niger 2002-03-04
- October 1, 2002: US Intelligence Completes National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq 2002-10-01
- After October 7, 2002: State Department Neoconservative Bars Dissenting Analysts from Attending Meetings on Iraq 2002-10-07
- October 7, 2002: Bush Uses Groundless Evidence to Tout Hussein as a Direct Threat to US 2002-10-07
- October 15, 2002: State Department Distributes Niger Documents to Other US Intelligence Agencies; Bizarre Document Alleging Alliance of Muslim Countries Surfaces for First Time 2002-10-15
- January 10, 2003: High-Level CIA Report Notes Dissenting Views on Aluminum Tubes 2003-01-10
- January 31, 2003: State Department’s Intelligence Bureau Flags 38 Claims in Powell’s UN Speech as ‘Weak,’ ‘Unsubstantiated’ 2003-01-31
- February 2, 2003: State Department’s Intelligence Bureau Finds More ‘Unverifiable’ Items in Powell’s Speech 2003-02-02
- February 3, 2003: Colin Powell Warned Not To Cite Aluminum Tubes as Evidence of Iraq Nuclear Weapons Program 2003-02-03
- January 30-February 4, 2003: Powell’s Team Compiles Information for Upcoming Presentation on Its Own 2003-02-04
- February 5, 2003: Powell Gives Fraudulent Presentation About Iraqi WMDs to UN 2003-02-05
- May 28, 2003: A Joint Report by the CIA and DIA Concludes that Trailers Found in Iraq Were Designed to Produce Biological Weapons 2003-05-28
- May 29, 2003: Libby Calls for Information about Wilson’s Trip to Niger 2003-05-29
- June 2, 2003: State Department Intelligence Agency Warns Powell that CIA-DIA Paper On Trailer Not Supported by Current Intel 2003-06-02
- June 10, 2003: State Department Memo Identifies Plame Wilson as Covert CIA Agent 2003-06-10
- June 12, 2003: Deputy Secretary of State Asks for Wilson Information 2003-06-12
- June 13, 2003: Columnist Contradicts Rice’s, Cheney’s Disavowal of Knowledge of Iraq-Niger Forgeries 2003-06-13
- July 7, 2003: State Department Memo Identifying Plame Wilson Sent to Powell through White House 2003-07-07
- July 11, 2003: Rice Claims Neither Bush, Cheney, Nor Herself Were Informed of Dissents Regarding Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes 2003-07-11
- July 18, 2003: White House Releases Heavily Redacted Version of October 2002 NIE 2003-07-18
- March 5, 2004: Libby Lies to Grand Jury 2004-03-05
- February 18, 2007: Former CIA Agents Refute Claims that Libby Prosecution Unwarranted, Accuse Washington Post of Jury Tampering 2007-02-18
- June 2004: Former Intelligence Chief: Aluminum Tubes Allegations ‘Far Worse’ Than Even Iraq-Niger Uranium Claims
- December 2001: State Department Concludes Iraq-Niger Uranium Allegation ‘Bogus’
- Fall 2002 and After: Vice President Cheney’s Power Peaks as He Uses Bureaucratic Strategies to Manage Foreign Policy Himself
- Early 2001: State Department Analyst against War on Iraq Is Sidelined
- Early October 2002: Bush Receives Intelligence Memo Noting Dissents About Iraqi Aluminum Tubes
- January 2003: Bush Receives Intelligence Memo Saying Iraq ‘Unlikely’ to Attack US Unless Provoked
- Autumn 2003: Bolton Changes Procedures for Evidence Handling in Pentagon So His Office Will Receive More Classified Material
- Late September 2002: Energy Department Official Supports Assessment That Iraq Has Nuclear Program, Ignoring Position of Its Scientists