Central Intelligence Agency
Events (1798)
- July 11, 1997: George Tenet Becomes New Director of CIA 1997-07-11
- After July 11, 1997: CIA Significantly Expands Paramilitary Capacity under New Director Tenet 1997-07-11
- August 21, 1997: US Raids Al-Qaeda Cell Member’s House but Fails to Stop Embassy Bombing Plot 1997-08-21
- September 18, 1997: CIA Gives Awards to 50 Former Officers to Mark Anniversary 1997-09-18
- April 15, 1998: Libya Issues First Arrest Warrant for Bin Laden 1998-04-15
- 1997-May 29, 1998: US Creates Plan to Capture Bin Laden, but CIA Director Tenet Cancels It 1998-05-29
- May 30, 1998: Pakistan Conducts Last of Six Nuclear Bomb Tests, Plutonium Possibly Used 1998-05-30
- 5:30 a.m., August 7, 1998: Bomber Arrested in Pakistan Four Hours before Embassy Bombings; US Officials Keep His Immediate Confession Secret for Over a Week 1998-08-07
- Before August 7, 1998: CIA Has Multiple Informants in Al-Qaeda Cell Planning African Embassy Bombings 1998-08-07
- Shortly After August 7, 1998: MI6 Withholds Key Information about Embassy Bombings from FBI 1998-08-07
- After August 7, 1998: CIA Focuses on Yemeni Terror Group, London Connection Found to Be ‘Crucial’ 1998-08-07
- August 8-15, 1998: Bombing Informant Again Reveals Key Information 1998-08-08
- August 19, 1998: CIA Learns Bin Laden’s Travel Plans before Missile Strike 1998-08-19
- August 24, 1998: Bombed Training Camps Were Built by US and Allies 1998-08-24
- November 1, 1998-February 2001: Atta and Other Islamic Militants Are Monitored by US and Germany in Hamburg Apartment 1998-11-01
- December 1, 1998: Bin Laden Actively Planning Attacks Inside US 1998-12-01
- December 2, 1998: Clinton Meets Pakistani Leader but Bin Laden Not Top Priority 1998-12-02
- December 4, 1998: CIA Director Issues Ineffective Declaration of War on Al-Qaeda 1998-12-04
- After December 4, 1998: Following CIA Director Tenet’s Declaration of War, His Deputy Chairs Single Meeting; No Strategic Plan Drafted 1998-12-04
- December 24, 1998: President Clinton Signs Order Authorizing the Assassination of Bin Laden 1998-12-24
- December 26, 1998 and After: CIA Apparently Does Not Understand It Is Authorized to Assassinate Bin Laden; Bin Laden Unit Not Informed 1998-12-26
- January 31, 1999: Germany Monitors 9/11 Hijacker’s Calls, Shares Information with CIA 1999-01-31
- April 22, 1999: Plame Wilson Lists CIA Front Company as Employer on Donation Form 1999-04-22
- April 26, 1999: Former President Bush: Those Who Leak CIA Identities Are ‘The Most Insidious of Traitors’ 1999-04-26
- September 21, 1999: German Intelligence Records Calls Between Hijacker and Others Linked to Al-Qaeda 1999-09-21
- November 4, 1999: CIA Rejects Proposal for Center to Share Data on Terrorist Threats 1999-11-04
- December 3, 1999: CIA Tells Top Administration Officials It Will Continue Renditions against Al-Qaeda 1999-12-03
- December 11, 1999: Watch List Importance Is Stressed but Procedures Are Not Followed 1999-12-11
- December 24-31, 1999: Hijacked Flight Leads to Freeing of Future 9/11 Funder; ISI Allegedly Supports Hijacking 1999-12-24
- Shortly Before December 29, 1999: NSA Monitors 9/11 Hijackers Talking to Each Other about Upcoming Al-Qaeda Summit 1999-12-29
- December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers 1999-12-29
- December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000: Attacks Against US Targets Avoided through Alerts and Luck 1999-12-31
- (January 2-5, 2000): Al-Qaeda Operative Linked to 9/11 Hijackers Possibly Makes Quick Trip to US 2000-01-02
- January 2-4, 2000: US Intelligence Loses Track of 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi as He Travels to Malaysia 2000-01-02
- January 2-5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa as He Is Tracked to Al-Qaeda Summit 2000-01-02
- 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa 2000-01-05
- January 5, 2000: CIA Warns Other Intelligence Agencies that Almihdhar Has Visa to US, but Lies about FBI Knowledge of This 2000-01-05
- (January 5-8, 2000): CIA Fails to Act on Triangle of Calls Linking Malaysia Summit,ColeBomber’s House, and 9/11 Hijackers’ Hotel 2000-01-05
- January 5-6, 2000: CIA Liaison with FBI Who Just Learned About Almihdhar’s US Visa Twice Fails to Tell FBI about It 2000-01-05
- January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 andColePlots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It 2000-01-05
- (January 5-8, 2000): Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Attendees Photographed 2000-01-05
- January 5, 2000: Malaysian Intelligence Only Videotapes First Day of Al-Qaeda Summit, 9/11 Hijackers Videotaped with Hambali 2000-01-05
- January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After: Malaysian Authorities Monitor Al-Qaeda Leaders at Kuala Lumpur Summit 2000-01-05
- January 5-9, 2000: Malaysian Authorities Send CIA Information about Al-Qaeda Summit 2000-01-05
- Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Officer Sends out Cable with False Claim FBI Has Been Told of Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa 2000-01-05
- January 6, 2000: CIA Informs FBI Leaders about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but Fails to Mention One Attendee Has US Visa 2000-01-06
- January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Says Information about Hijacker Almihdhar Cannot Be Shared with FBI Because Next Al-Qaeda Attack Will Be in Southeast Asia 2000-01-06
- January 6, 2000: Two Malaysia Summit Attendees Travel to Singapore and Thailand, But Agents Monitoring Them Fail to Get Their Names 2000-01-06
- January 6-9, 2000: Top CIA and Clinton Cabinet Officials Repeatedly Briefed about Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia 2000-01-06
- (After January 6, 2000): CIA Fails to Check FBI Has Been Notified of 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa, Although this Is ‘Routine Practice’ 2000-01-06