Central Intelligence Agency
Events (1798)
- Late 1998: Al-Qaeda Leader Located in Sudan, but US Does Not Try to Capture Him
- Late 1998-Early 2002: US Intelligence Maps Al-Qaeda Network Using Phone Records; Many Attacks Thwarted
- Late 1998: US Initiates New Effort to Stop Financing of Al-Qaeda, but to Little Effect
- Late 1998: US Investigators Reassess Bin Laden’s Finances, Discover Saudi ‘Fundraising Machine’
- Late 1999: Saudis Claim to Add Two 9/11 Hijackers to Watch List and Inform CIA
- Late December 1999: FBI Exposes Errors in CIA Reporting on Millennium Plots, Finds Key Evidence CIA Ignored
- Late March-Early April 2001: CIA Warns Al-Qaeda Leader Zubaida Planning an Attack
- Late Summer 2001: Jordan Warns US that Aircraft Will Be Used in Major Attack Inside the US
- Late Summer 2003: 9/11 Commission Requests Some Presidential Daily Briefs from CIA, Knows Credibility Is on the Line
- Mid-2000: DEA Arranges for Source Knowledgeable about Bin Laden to Meet FBI
- (Mid-January 2000): CIA Officer Discusses Almihdhar with FBI Counterpart, Fails to Mention His US Visa
- (Mid-January-February 2003): CIA Officer Who Threatened Detainee with Gun and Drill Recalled
- Mid-March 2002: CIA Allows 10 Aggressive Interrogation Techniques of Dubious Legality, Including Waterboarding
- Mid-April 2002: New CIA Team Arriving to Interrogate Zubaida Uses Completely Untried and Dubious Techniques
- Between Mid-April and Mid-May 2002: CIA Psychologist Opposed to Torture Techniques Planned for Zubaida Leaves in Disgust
- Mid-May 2001: CIA Manager Says Photo Identification Is Incorrect, Hinting He Has Greater Knowledge of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Figures
- Mid-May, 2002: CIA Proposes Waterboarding of Zubaida to Senior Administration Officials
- Mid-2006: CIA Suffered Long-Lasting Damage from Depredations by Bush Administration, Say Former CIA Officials
- Mid-July, 2004: CIA Officer Writes Memo Confirming He, Not Plame Wilson, Suggested Joseph Wilson Go to Niger
- Mid-August, 2003: CIA Supervisor Tells Plame Wilson She Acted Correctly in Asking Husband to Meet with CIA Officials over Iraq-Niger Allegations
- Mid-September 1985: North Persuades Former CIA Agent to Assist in Funneling Illegal Funds, Arms to Contras
- Mid-October 2005: Justice Department Decides Not to Prosecute in CIA Abuse Cases
- Mid-October, 1986: Reagan Staffer Abrams and CIA Officials Lie to Congress about Administration Involvement with Contras
- Mid-November 2001: Bin Laden ‘Confession’ Video Made, according to US
- Mid-December 2002: Al-Nashiri Assessed to Be ‘Compliant’ after Torture
- Mid- to Late-1990s: CIA Suffers ‘Brain Drain’
- Mid-2002: Al-Qaeda Operatives with WMD Connections Interviewed but Remain Free in Sudan
- Mid-2003: US Suspicious that Major Saudi Bank Is Supporting Islamic Militants, But Takes No Action against It
- Mid-2003: CIA Suggests Major Saudi Bank Is Being Used to Fund Militants
- (Mid-2006): US Transfers ‘Ghost’ Prisoner Ghul to Pakistani Custody
- Mid-1980s: CIA Obtains Plans for Pakistan Nuclear Facility
- Mid-1980s: Pakistani ISI and CIA Gain from Drug Production
- Mid-1986 and After: Interagency Nuclear Weapons Group Comes to View State Department as ‘Security Problem’
- Mid-1990s: CIA Sets Up Fronts to Penetrate Nuclear Smuggling Ring Using Unconventional Tactics
- Mid-January-Late January 1973: Watergate Defendant Warns of Dire Consequences if White House Attempts to Blame CIA
- Summer 2002: CIA Begins Moving Iraqi Operatives into US to Train for Anabasis Plan
- September 2002: Anabasis Team Begins Training in Nevada Desert
- January 2003: CIA Moves Anabasis Team to Jordan
- January 2002: Planners of Covert Operation Against Iraq Told, ‘Be Ready to Turn This Thing On by January 2003’
- Before October 1993: Al-Qaeda Leaders Travel to Somalia from Monitored Base in Sudan
- 2002-2004: CIA Builds Network of ‘Black Stations’
- April 2002 and After: Cabinet-Level Bush Officials Frequently Discuss and Approve Specific ‘Harsh’ Interrogation Techniques
- Spring 2000: CIA Continues Efforts to Recruit Man Close to Hamburg Cell
- Spring 2000: CIA Paramilitary Teams Begin Working with Anti-Taliban Forces
- Spring 2000: Briefings for CIA Panel Indicate Pakistan Is ‘the US Number One Enemy’
- Spring 2001: Senior Bush Administration Officials Discuss Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, But No Action Ensues
- Spring 2002: CIA Realizes Bush Administration Is Planning to Invade Iraq
- Spring-Late 2002: CIA Videotapes Interrogations of High Value Detainees
- Spring 2002: CIA Afghanistan Intelligence Gathering Plan Flounders for Lack of Funding
- Spring 2008: CIA Director Told about Al-Qaeda Assassination and Capture Program