George J
Events (317)
- June 1999: CIA Fires Bin Laden Unit Chief, But He Refuses to Resign from Agency
- 2006: Tenet Says New Evidence Completely Disproves Atta-Iraq Link
- Mid-July 2001: CIA Director Tenet Warns National Security Adviser Rice About Major Attack
- Mid-July 2001: Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz Doubts Attack Warnings
- July 2004: CIA Requests Second White House Authorization for Harsh Interrogation Tactics
- July 24 or 28, 2001: Captured Operative Had Links That Could Have Led to Moussaoui, 9/11 Plot
- July 1998-February 2000: CIA Renders Over Two Dozen Islamic Militant Operatives
- Late July-August 2001: US Fails to Capture or Kill Al-Zawahiri
- Mid-August 1998-2000: US Submarines Ready to Attack Bin Laden
- September 7-October 2000: Predator Flights over Afghanistan Are Initiated Then Halted
- September 2002: Congressional Leaders Allegedly Briefed on CIA Interrogation Techniques, but Do Not Complain
- September 2002: CIA Director Allows Ad Hoc Intelligence Agency to Undermine US Intelligence Apparatus
- September 2002: Congressional ‘Top Secret’ Briefings Disclose Little New Information
- October 2001: CIA Helps Arrest Egyptian Militant Leader Linked to Bin Laden
- October 1999: CIA Does Not Share Information with Able Danger Program
- February 2009: National Security Council Legal Adviser: Decision to Create Military Commissions a ‘Process Failure’ with Serious Long-Term Ramifications
- December 2000: Incoming Bush Administration Briefed on Terrorism Threat; Apparently Ignores Recommendations
- December 2002: President Bush Expresses Confidence Victory in Iraq Will Solve Counterterrorism Problems
- December 2003: Powell Disheartened by Failure to Find Iraqi WMD
- 1997: Undercover CIA Agent Valerie Plame Returns to US
- Early September 2001: CIA Assets Penetrated Al-Qaeda Training Camps by This Time
- 1993-1999: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for Al-Qaeda
- 1993: CIA Declares Bin Laden Significant Financial Backer of Islamic Militants
- 1997: CIA Deems Saudi Intelligence ‘Hostile Service’ Regarding Al-Qaeda
- 1997: CIA Establishes Renditions Branch, Helps with Up to 70 Renditions Before 9/11
- 1999: CIA Builds Network of Informants throughout Afghanistan, Central Asia
- 1999-2001: Clinton Awards Victimized Former Analyst $1 Million in Compensation, but He Never Receives It
- After July 1997: CIA Obtains Domestic Call and Financial Information to Support ‘Black Ops’
- Early 2004: White House Asks 9/11 Commission Not to Call for CIA Director Tenet’s Resignation
- Early October-December 2001: US and Pakistan Do Little about Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Who Helped Al-Qaeda
- Early 2005 and After: President Bush Allegedly Fails to Pressure Pakistani President Musharraf to Take Action against Al-Qaeda Safe Haven
- Late January 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Tells CIA 9/11 Was Its Fault; CIA Is Displeased
- Late 2001: German Intelligence Reportedly Prevents Arrest of Alleged Al-Qaeda-CIA Double Agent with 9/11 Foreknowledge
- Late March 2002: President Bush Allegedly Takes Personal Interest in Interrogation of Zubaida
- Late April 1998 and Shortly After: Tenet Unhappy over Saudi Information Sharing, Suggests Al-Qaeda Leader Wants to Assassinate Vice President
- Late July 2001: Taliban Intelligence Chief Wants Secret Contact with US to ‘Save Afghanistan’
- Late July 2001: CIA Official Says of Al-Qaeda, ‘They’re Coming Here’
- Late October 2000: Clinton Considers Missile Attack on Bin Laden
- Late December 2000: Sexual Liaisons Cost Wolfowitz Post as Director of CIA
- Late 1990s: CIA Director Tenet Has Direct, Private Channels to Saudi Leaders
- Late 2001: Only about 500 US Fighters Take Part in Afghanistan War
- Late 1996: CIA Definitively Confirms Bin Laden Is Not Just Financier, but US Is Slow to Act
- Late July 2001: CIA Director Tenet Believes Warnings Could Not ‘Get Any Worse’
- Mid-July 2001: Pentagon Official Suggests to CIA Director Tenet that Al-Qaeda Is Just ‘Phantom Enemy’
- Mid- to Late-1990s: CIA Suffers ‘Brain Drain’
- Mid-1990s: CIA Sets Up Fronts to Penetrate Nuclear Smuggling Ring Using Unconventional Tactics
- Late November 2001 or December 2001: CIA Devises Covert Plan ‘Anabasis’ to Provide Pretext for Full-Scale War with Iraq
- April 2002 and After: Cabinet-Level Bush Officials Frequently Discuss and Approve Specific ‘Harsh’ Interrogation Techniques
- Spring 2000: Briefings for CIA Panel Indicate Pakistan Is ‘the US Number One Enemy’
- Spring 2001: CIA Director Tenet Warns Congress an Attempted Terrorist Attack against US Interests Is Likely within a Year