Philip Zelikow

Events (93)

• January 2004: Lone 9/11 Commission Staffer Decides to Read Though Small Portion of Ignored NSA Material Herself
• January 2004: White House Refuses to Allow 9/11 Commission Access to Additional Presidential Daily Briefs despite Deal, Commission Hires Lawyer to Draft Subpoena
• January 2004: Zelikow Tries to Have 9/11 Commission Back Contentious Link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda
• January 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Backs Down on Allegations of Connections between Iraq and Al-Qaeda
• January 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Rewrites Staff Reports, Wants to Read them All at Hearings
• February 2003 or After: 9/11 Commission Staff Set up ‘Back-Channel Network’ to Report on Executive Director Zelikow’s Behavior
• (February-April 2003): 9/11 Commissioners Rarely Visit Commission’s Offices, Giving Executive Director Zelikow More Power
• February 2004: 9/11 Commission Does Not Subpoena White House over Presidential Daily Briefs due to Last-Ditch Intervention by Executive Director Zelikow
• March 2003: Zelikow and 9/11 Commission Consultant Complete Outline of Final Report before Staff Start Writing It
• (April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from 9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from Congressional Inquiry
• April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
• April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
• May 2003 and Before: 9/11 Commissioner Argues Panel Should Investigate False Claims of Iraq Link to 9/11, but Other Commissioners Not Interested
• May-June 2004: Zelikow Has Portions of 9/11 Commission Report Rewritten to Be More Favorable to National Security Adviser Rice
• May 2000: Future Authors of 9/11 Report Produce John F. Kennedy Book Riddled with Errors
• June 2004: Zelikow Has Comparison with Clinton Unfavorable to Bush Deleted from 9/11 Commission Report
• June 2004: Top Democrat Helps Get Passages Critical of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice Deleted from Final Text of 9/11 Commission Report
• June 2004: Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Team Leader Delete Passages about Apparent Saudi Support for Hijackers from Main Text of Final Report
• Early June 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Accepts Lack of Connections between Iraq and Al-Qaeda
• June 2004: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Discusses Key Presidential Daily Brief with CIA Analyst, Allegedly Pressures Analyst to Accept White House Version of Events
• June 2005: State Department Adviser Challenges Legal Justifications for Torture
• July 2004: 9/11 Commission Staffers Protest over ‘Whitewash’ of FBI’s Performance before Attacks, Win Minor Changes to Final Report
• August 2003: 9/11 Commission Staffer Reviews NSC Documents; Favors Clarke’s Account of Bush Administration’s Treatment of Terrorist Warnings over Rice’s
• September 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Lunches with National Security Adviser Rice and Her Staff
• October 2003: Members of 9/11 Commission Meet with ISI
• November 1997-August 1998: Future 9/11 Commission Staff Attend Terrorism Study Group; Predict Consequences of ‘Catastrophic Terrorism’
• Mid-December 2002-March 2003: 9/11 Commission Gets Off to Slow Start
• 1995: Condoleezza Rice and Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Co-author Book on European Politics
• Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Appoints Current CIA Officer to Lead Investigation of CIA
• Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Assumes Responsibility for Hiring Commission’s Staff
• Around February 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Assumes Close Control of Key Commission Team
• Before June 2004: 9/11 Commission Consultant Complains Report Is ‘Indulgent’ of Senior Administration Officials
• Before June 2004: 9/11 Commission Awards Contract to Distribute Final Report to Executive Director Zelikow’s Publisher; Publisher Can Keep Profits
• Early March 2004: Executive Director Zelikow Demands 9/11 Commission Subpoena Forthcoming Book by Former Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’
• Early 2004: 9/11 Commission Staffer Wants to Quit over Executive Director Zelikow’s Alleged Protection of Rice
• (Late October-Early November 2003): 9/11 Commission Staff Discusses Pentagon Subpoena, Major Argument in Some Accounts
• Late January 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Tells CIA 9/11 Was Its Fault; CIA Is Displeased
• Late January 2003: White House Counsel Gonzales Denies 9/11 Commission Access to White House Documents
• Late 2002-July 2004: 9/11 Commission Initially Pays Little Attention to NSA Material
• Late 2003-2004: 9/11 Commission Suspects Interrogated Detainees Are Harshly Treated
• Late 2003: NSA Allows 9/11 Commission Access to Files, but Commission Not Interested
• Spring 2004: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Receives Memo Urging Criminal Referral of False Statements by Pentagon, FAA; No Action Taken for Months
• Summer 2004: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Investigated over Mishandling of Classified Information