Rich B

Events (41)

• January 5-15, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Fails to Draft Proper Report about Malaysia Summit 2000-01-05
• January 12, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing 2000-01-12
• January 14, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Again Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing 2000-01-14
• January 15, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Stops Operations Linked to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit 2000-01-15
• After October 12, 2000: CIA Discusses Increased Support for Northern Alliance in Wake ofColeBombing 2000-10-12
• May 30, 2001: CIA Leaders Warn Rice about Expected Al-Qaeda Attack 2001-05-30
• June 28, 2001: CIA Leaders Told Bin Laden Will Launch Spectacular Attack against US and/or Israeli Targets within Weeks 2001-06-28
• July 5, 2001: CIA Officer Says Malaysia Summit Attendees May Be Linked to Current Threat Reporting 2001-07-05
• July 10, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefed about Al-Qaeda; Urgent White House Meeting Results 2001-07-10
• July 10, 2001: CIA Director Gives Urgent Warning to White House of Imminent, Multiple, Simultaneous Al-Qaeda Attacks, Possibly Within US 2001-07-10
• July 13, 2001: CIA Manager Says Extra Person to Be Allocated to Malaysia Summit Re-evaluation, Unclear If this Happens 2001-07-13
• July 13, 2001: CIA Reexamines Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but ‘Major League Killer’ Is Not Put on Watch List 2001-07-13
• July 23, 2001: CIA Officer Says Al-Qaeda Leader’s Associates like Almihdhar Are of ‘Very High Interest’, Mentions Mysterious Almihdhar Connection 2001-07-23
• September 9, 2001: Northern Alliance Informs CIA of Massoud Assassination; News Soon Leaks 2001-09-09
• August 22-September 10, 2001: Unclear If Bin Laden Unit Briefs Top CIA Management about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Presence in US; Unit Chief Knows He Is Likely Attacker 2001-09-10
• After 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Liaison Refuses to Share the Passenger Lists for the Hijacked Planes with the CIA 2001-09-11
• Shortly After 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: Head of CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Blames Al-Qaeda for the Crash at the WTC 2001-09-11
• After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: CIA Analysts Initially Think Hezbollah Is behind the Terrorist Attacks 2001-09-11
• Shortly After September 11, 2001: CIA Manager Proposes ‘Hit Teams’ to Carry Out Assassinations in Middle East, Africa, and Europe 2001-09-11
• December 9, 2001: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Boss Becomes New Chief of CIA’s Kabul Station During Tora Bora Battle 2001-12-09
• Shortly After December 19, 2001: CIA Station Chief Protests against FBI Interview of Al-Libi 2001-12-19
• January 10, 2003: Government Employees Responsible for 9/11 Failures Are Rewarded and Promoted 2003-01-10
• February 23, 2004: Nomination of Former CIA Bin Laden Unit Chief to State Department Rank Announced 2004-02-23
• January 28, 2007: Chief of CIA’s Bin Laden Unit on 9/11 Said to Be Son of ‘Controversial’ Former CIA Figure 2007-01-28
• August 11, 2011: Former Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Says CIA Deliberately Withheld Information from Him before 9/11 2011-08-11
• January-February 2007: Former CIA Bin Laden Unit Chief Considered for Baghdad Station, but Is Rejected
• (September 1984-September 1986): Later Head of CIA’s Alec Station Serves in Central African Republic
• February 1996-June 1999: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Has Conflicts with CIA Superiors and Other Intelligence Agencies
• (May 1989-January 1991): Later Head of CIA’s Alec Station Serves in Niger
• June 2005: Revised CIA Inspector General Report Completed; Recommends Accountability Boards for Several Officers
• June 1999: CIA Appoints New Chief of Bin Laden Unit; His Management Style Is Not Popular
• July 1999-Summer 2001: Friction Continues between New CIA Bin Laden Unit Chief and FBI Official John O’Neill
• Early April 2001: CIA Meets Northern Alliance Leader in Paris, Receives Warning of Major Al-Qaeda Attack
• October 1999: CIA Considers Increased Aid to Northern Alliance
• Summer 1995: CIA Designs Program to Abduct Islamist Militants and Send them to Egypt
• 1998 and After: CIA Instigates Co-operation with Uzbekistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda
• Between Mid-January and July 2000: CIA’s Counterterrorist Center Reorganized, Bin Laden Unit Placed in Larger Group
• Early 2004: 9/11 Commission Allegedly Prevented from Naming Junior CIA Officer Responsible for Pre-9/11 Failure by Threats from Senior CIA Officials
• Late July 2001: CIA Official Says of Al-Qaeda, ‘They’re Coming Here’
• Summer 2001: Two CIA Bin Laden Experts Consider Resigning in Protest
• Summer 1999: CIA Decides to Increase Ties with Northern Alliance, Decision Pushed through by Counterterrorist Center